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I. INTRODUCTION
Under what conditions is it morally permissible to kill someone in order
to save your own life—or the life of another who is threatened? There
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seem to be clear cases.  Threatened by an assailant who is trying to kill 
you for no good reason, you may use lethal force if necessary to save
yourself from death or serious injury from the assailant’s attack.
Threatened with death in the form of an onrushing runaway truck, you 
may not save yourself by using a bystander or imposing on a bystander in
a way that inflicts severe harm on her.  In a justly celebrated essay, Judith 
Thomson notes that it is permissible to kill a “Villainous Aggressor” when
necessary to save oneself from grievous harm, but adds that the evil intent — 
and thus culpability—of the Villainous Aggressor is not a necessary
condition for justified self-defense.1  She suggests that if we remove the 
elements of evil intent and culpability, and imagine an “Innocent Aggressor” 
whose actions pose a threat of causing one grave physical harm, one gets 
a similar moral permission to kill in self-defense.2  Moreover, if we remove
the element of agency altogether, and imagine an “Innocent Threat,”
whose bodily movements pose a threat of inflicting grave physical harm
on one, but who is not at fault in any way for posing this threat, and is not 
doing anything at all, one gets a similar moral permission to kill in self­
defense.3  Still, Thomson asserts, the differences between Villainous
Aggressor, Innocent Aggressor, and Innocent Threat make “no moral
difference”—to the permissibility of self-defense.4  Hence, according to 
Thomson, “it is permissible for you to proceed in Innocent Threat just as
in Villainous Aggressor and Innocent Aggressor.”5  Pondering these 
suggestions, she proposes, “I fancy we overrate the role of fault in many
areas of moral theory.”6 
II. FAULT FORFEITS FIRST
To show that fault and culpability play more of a role in determining 
when it is permissible to kill to save one’s life than Thomson allows, we 
simply need to vary the numbers of people who must be killed to save a 
threatened individual’s life. To a first approximation, it is morally permissible 
to kill any number of Villainous Aggressors to save the life of just one 
threatened victim.  Morality prefers the outcome in which the threatened
victim lives even though this requires killing not just one but many
Villainous Aggressors—even an entire army of them.7  I say “to a first
 1. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 283–84 (1991).
2. Id. at 284–85. 
3. Id. at 287. 
4. Id.
 5. Id
 6. Id. at 286. 
7. See Uwe Steinhoff, Proportionality in Self-Defense, 21 J. ETHICS, 263, 271 (2017)
[hereinafter Self-Defense].
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approximation” because this wide permission to kill Villainous Aggressors
when necessary to save one’s own life gives out at some point.  Would it 
be acceptable to kill a billion Villainous Aggressors to save one’s life? 
Surely not.
In contrast, even if we were to agree with the controversial judgment
that it is justifiable to kill a single Innocent Aggressor to save one’s life, 
and with Thomson’s even more controversial judgment that it is morally 
justifiable to kill a single Innocent Threat to save one’s own life, these 
judgments would shift quickly if we imagine that more than one innocent 
person must be killed if one is to survive the threat.8  If morality permits 
us to kill virtually any number of Villainous Aggressors to save one’s life, 
but at most a few Innocent Aggressors, and perhaps at most a single Innocent 
Threat, a likely explanation and justification is that the culpability or 
nonculpability of the people whose behavior or bodily movements threaten 
to cause one harm make a large difference to what it is morally permissible
to do in response to a threat to one’s physical safety.9 
This Article explores the role that culpability should play in the ethics 
of justified killing with special attention to cases of self-defense.  Someone 
who is culpable or blameworthy is an eligible recipient of blame for an 
action one has done, a choice one has made, a neglect or inattention one 
has shown, or a trait one possesses.  A culpable person is a responsible agent 
who has failed to conform to moral requirements and lacks a complete 
8. See Thomson, supra note 1, at 284, 287. 
9. Uwe Steinhoff disagrees; he maintains morality permits one to kill any number 
of Innocent Aggressors if necessary to guarantee one avoids suffering grievous harm from 
their attack. See generally Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and
the Ethics of Armed Conflicts 53, 71, 96 (2016) [hereinafter Just War Theory] (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).  However, I doubt his view results from his adoption of a
Thomson-type perspective on the slight importance of culpability.  More likely, he is moved by
the thought that a person, whose right not to be attacked is being violated, has a broad license 
to resist the attack. In other contexts, he stresses the importance of culpability, holding, for 
example, that unnecessary attacks on morally innocent aggressors are impermissible
whereas unnecessary attacks on culpable aggressors are permissible. Id. at 63–64. In this 
latter context, he cautions against “the modern ‘liberal’ philosophy professor’s warm­
hearted, aggressor-friendly intuitions.” Id. at 61.  Here he is defending the idea that the 
culpable aggressor forfeits his right to life, and is not wronged if he is killed, no matter 
what the reason.  Steinhoff adds, “[t]he unjust aggressor has broken his ‘contract’ with you
to respect each other’s rights, so you are under no obligation anymore to respect his rights.” 
Id.  For my own aggressor-friendly intuitions, see Parts 6 and 7 of this Article.
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excuse for the failure.10  Culpability varies by degree.11  For purposes of 
this Article I shall suppose that what renders a person culpable or blameworthy
is failure to show due consideration to the rights and interests of other 
people.
However, this formulation just stated might seem palpably inadequate. 
Surely one can be either blameworthy or blameless for failing to show due 
consideration to the rights and interests of other people.  Perhaps one 
nonculpably has come to accept an incorrect account of what constitutes 
due consideration for others, so when one dutifully gives others due consideration
according to this incorrect account, one is actually failing to show due
consideration for others.  But in these circumstances, this failure does not 
render one blameworthy.  So I shall propose that we should interpret
the due consideration requirement as subjective: what one fundamentally 
owes to others and to oneself is to make a conscientious effort to determine 
what treatment others should receive and what treatment one owes to them
and how properly to balance consideration for others and concern for
oneself—and then to make a good faith effort to conform one’s conduct 
to what one conscientiously takes to be what one owes them. Treating
people with due consideration and concern, in the way that matters for
culpability, is making a conscientious effort to figure out what conduct 
one owes others and striving conscientiously to conform one’s conduct to 
that standard. 
But this subjective interpretation of due consideration as conscientious
effort prompts questions and objections, some of which this essay tries to 
address in Part VI. This aspect of the account is more controversial than 
the generic idea of fault forfeits first, which could be accepted by readers
who reject the subjective construal of culpability.12 
In addition to holding that culpability can amplify one’s liability to
defensive harm and lack of culpability can dampen such liability, I suggest 
a further role: culpability establishes a morally mandatory queue of eligible 
recipients of defensive violence.  One must choose to direct one’s defensive 
violence only at the person or persons highest in this queue whose killing
would save the victim from harm.  These ideas are expressed in the “fault
forfeits first” principle: 
Fault forfeits first: In a situation in which the bodily movements of some 
place others under threat of suffering physical harm, resulting in a 
predicament in which someone must die, if one person is significantly
morally at fault—culpable—with respect to this situation, and at fault—
 10. See discussion infra Parts V–VI. 
 11. Jeff McMahan, The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing, 15 PHIL. ISSUES
386, 395 (2005) [hereinafter Basis of Moral Liability].
12. See discussion infra Parts V–VI. 
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culpable—to a significantly greater extent than others with respect to this
situation, then it is morally preferable that this culpable agent should be
the one who dies.13  If there is a choice of saving an innocent life by killing 
a single culpable rather than a nonculpable agent, one morally is permitted 
only to save the innocent by killing the culpable.14 
Here is a broader formulation that extends the idea beyond self-defense:
A. Fault Forfeits First
All else being equal, the morally preferred target for violence directed
at undoing or preventing a serious evil or injustice is an agent who is 
seriously culpable with respect to that evil or injustice and more culpable 
than anyone else involved in the situation.
Both formulations should be understood as assuming that the number
of people who might be killed by different choices one contemplates would 
be the same. Therefore, fault forfeits first does not say one ought to kill
any number of more culpable persons, however large, rather than kill
a single less culpable person to avert an injustice.  The numbers matter.15 
More broadly, fault forfeits first is not a license to employ violence to
avert wrongful harm in ways that would violate a properly formulated
proportionality condition.16  If one can avert a rather small injustice only
by imposing death or very serious harm on a seriously culpable agent, who 
is most eligible for being a target of violence according to fault forfeits
first, the amount of harm one would have to inflict to avert the harm may
be excessive in relation to the appropriately weighted wrongful harm one 
would thereby be averting.17  In this case proportionality is violated.  Thus, 
attacking the culpable would be morally wrong.  Moreover, a full statement
of the proportionality condition would have to cover cases in which the 
likelihood and amount of wrongful harm that would ensue if one inflicts 
violence on the culpable vary and the comparative and absolute culpability 
13. SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 24 (2012).
14. Richard J. Arneson, Just Warfare Theory and Noncombatant Immunity, 39 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 663, 668–69 (2006) [hereinafter Just Warfare Theory].
15. See id. at 670 n.17. 
16. See generally Suzanne Uniacke, Proportionality and Self-Defense, 30 L. & PHIL. 
253 (2010) (discussing standards of proportionality).
17. See id. at 256 (“Proportionate self-defense requires that the threat fended
off/interest protected pass a threshold of comparable seriousness in relation to the harm 
inflicted on the attacker . . . . harm that exceeds a threshold of comparable seriousness is 
impermissible because [it is] disproportionate.”). 
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of the target of violence deployed to prevent or mitigate wrongful harm 
also varies.18  A morally sensitive cost and benefit calculation is called for
when the option of using violence to reduce injustice is being contemplated.
The import of fault forfeits first is to assert that culpability trumps the 
factor of causal involvement in generating wrongful harm.  Tom may be 
acting in a way that is a major or sole cause of impending harm to someone 
and Tomasina may be culpable with respect to this situation but not causally
involved in posing a threat of harm to anyone; yet, fault forfeits first can
single out Tomasina as the morally mandatory target of any violence that 
might be deployed to reduce wrongful harm. 
As stated, fault forfeits first does not take a stand for or against the moral 
permissibility of killing an Innocent Aggressor or Innocent Threat if one 
faces a stark choice: allow the threatened victim to die or kill an Innocent
Aggressor or an Innocent Threat.19  Fault forfeits first does not involve
any commitment to the claim that moral fault is a necessary condition for
justified killing in self-defense.20 
However, if two perfectly blameless individuals have the misfortune of 
interacting in a way that threatens them with the imposition of death or 
severe injury, I suggest that morality does not favor attaching the harm to 
one of these persons rather than the other.  If one is blamelessly attacking 
the other, principles attuned to culpability should hold the fair distribution
of harm is that—given one must suffer harm—each should be accorded 
an equal chance of avoiding it.21  This does not entirely deny a right of 
self-defense to the wrongfully attacked victim; there is surely no more 
moral aptness that the harm should fall on him rather than on his attacker. 
Ideally a coin flip should determine who suffers the unavoidable harm. 
Here are some examples to illustrate the idea.22
 18. See Just War Theory, supra note 9, at 19. 
19. See Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1572 n.39 (1999). 
20. Just Warfare Theory, supra note 14, at 668–69. 
21. Id. at 672. 
22. To reiterate, this Article makes several suggestions that are differentially controversial. 
One suggestion is that culpability is a significant factor that affects whom it is permissible 
to attack to mitigate unjust threats.  Another is that fault—culpability—forfeits first. A 
third is that one being culpable with respect to the situation is a necessary condition for
being permissibly attacked.  A fourth is that culpability to any degree does not open the
door to being permissibly attacked to mitigate an unjust threat unless attacking someone 
is necessary to this end.
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B. Accommodation 
You are being chased by a villainous aggressor who is trying to kill you and
will succeed, unless you jump up into a niche where the aggressor cannot follow.
There is a bystander standing in the niche who has a perfect right to be there.  The 
bystander sees that if he accommodates you by moving to the back of the niche,
you can jump to it and both of you will be safe.  If the bystander does not move 
in this way, you could still save yourself, but only by jumping to the niche and
jostling this bystander, causing a fatal fall.  The bystander also sees that this is
the case.  The bystander declines to move to the back of the niche.23 
In this case I suppose it is morally permissible to jump to the niche, 
killing the bystander and saving your life.  Given the circumstances, the 
bystander’s failure to be reasonably accommodating renders him, compared 
to you, significantly and culpably at fault.24 
C. Projectile Threat 
Suppose you are standing at the bottom of a cliff.  Someone falls onto
you from above.  As it happens, the trajectory of the individual’s fall will 
bring it about that he will land on you, killing you, and because he happens 
to be well padded he will live no matter where he lands.  As it happens, 
you are unable to move out of the way to escape the body that is hurtling 
toward you, but you do have the option of using your ray gun to vaporize 
the person whose body is threatening you.  In that case he dies and you
live.25  This is an example of the Innocent Threat case that has elicited opposed
responses from Judith Thomson, Jeff McMahan, Michael Otsuka, and
others.26 
Fault forfeits first says that if someone in this situation is seriously at
fault with respect to it, and more culpable than anyone else involved in 
the situation, then that person is the person who ought to die if someone 
must die.  Suppose the person falling on you is a rock climber who was 
23. Just Warfare Theory, supra note 14, at 669. 
24. See e.g., HELEN FROWE, DEFENSIVE KILLING 21–45 (2014) (providing various 
examples in which one person is located where his body impedes another’s escape from
wrongful attack and discussing each example with a view to revising the distinction between a
bystander and a threat).
25. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34 (1974). 
26. There is a considerable amount of literature on this controversial issue.  See,
e.g., Michael Otsuka, Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74, 74– 
94 (1994); Thomson, supra note 1, at 287; see also JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 32– 
37 (2009) [hereinafter KILLING IN WAR] (discussing different interpretations of innocent).
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climbing without a rope, even though she knew her route would take her 
just over a much traveled hiking path at the crux move, and even though 
her skill level is not so outstanding as to make falling at that point a very 
unlikely event. The person is then reckless with respect to the risk she imposes
on you, and fault forfeits first yields the plausible implication that self-
defensive violence—if necessary to save the life of the threatened 
victim—is morally acceptable.27 
On the other hand, suppose you have put yourself in harm’s way on
purpose, for no legitimate reason.  The area is one where sublime but very 
tricky and dangerous rock climbs are located, and falls not that uncommon. 
Only the most experienced climbers attempt these climbs without a rope 
but, attracted to the sublimity of the climbs, and the added aesthetic beauty
of climbing without a rope, many of the very best climbers flock to this
area and—reasonably and justifiably—attempt these climbs, and falls do 
occur. You have passed by warning signs that say “Danger!  Climbing area 
ahead: Falls common.  Stay well away from the bottoms of the cliffs!” 
Moved by the idle and mildly sadistic curiosity that impels fans of fights 
in hockey games and spectators at car races to hope for fights and fiery 
crashes, you position yourself at the bottom of the cliff to have the best 
view of a fall should one occur.  You have no thought that you might act 
as a cushion for a falling climber and anyway the chances of this occurrence 
are small. However, as it happens, someone does fall on you, as described 
above.  In this situation you are culpably reckless with respect to the situation 
that has unfolded and—given your culpability—you may not save your 
life by vaporizing the nonculpable person who falls toward you.28  Again,
fault forfeits first yields plausible implications for this sort of case. 
D. Guilty Bystander 
You are driving up a narrow mountain road and encounter an Innocent 
Aggressor driving downhill in an armored vehicle that will soon smash
your vehicle.29  (In an alternative scenario, let the threat barreling down 
on you be an innocent threat.)  Your only lifesaving alternatives are to
blow up the ongoing threat or to turn your vehicle onto the shoulder of the 
road.  The shoulder is occupied by a person who just happens to be there 
and has a right to occupy the shoulder, but is wrongfully and culpably
desirous of your death, hopes the threat you face materializes, and is doing 
his best to harm you by throwing snowballs at your vehicle to distract your 
27. See Just Warfare Theory, supra note 14. 
28. See id.
 29. See id. at 671. 
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attention.  This person’s actions are entirely ineffectual and pose no threat
of harm to you.
In this case, I suppose one is morally required not to save your life by 
killing the Innocent Aggressor who threatens you, given that there is an
alternative way of saving your life that would result in the death of the
guilty bystander, a significantly culpable agent—one who is significantly 
more culpable than anyone else involved in this incident.  This is so, even
though this bystander bears no causal responsibility for the threat to your
life that you face and is behaving in a way that is actually harmless.30 
If fault forfeits first is correct, then we should be able to imagine that 
anyone involved in a self-defense scenario might be the person who ought
to die if anyone does—even the victim of the threatened or developing assault.
Blaming the victim may sometimes be appropriate because the person
who is most blameworthy with respect to a threatened or developing assault 
might, in some circumstances, be the intended victim of this assault.31 
Consider the following example: 
E. Guilty Victim 
Suppose I have been maliciously tormenting my wife with false accusations
of sexual infidelity on her part.  Coming from me, these accusations are
deeply wounding and inflict terrible suffering on her.  Finally, she reacts
by throwing a punch at me.  She intends to hurt me physically but not 
seriously wound me.  Unfortunately, unbeknownst to her, I have just acquired
a serious medical affliction, such that if her blow lands on my skull, it will 
30. In the example in the text, the guilty bystanders are acting, though without effect,
with intent to harm. In principle, fault forfeits first could identify—as the morally preferred 
person to die when someone’s behavior or movement threatens another with serious 
harm—a guilty bystander who is ill-disposed to the victim and directs hateful thoughts at 
her, and who would harm the victim wrongfully if he could. However, this guilty bystander 
has no action available and hence is neither acting nor trying to act toward the victim at 
all.  This concept embraces the suggestion in Just Warfare Theory, supra note 14, at 671. 
But see generally VICTOR TADROS, Causation, Culpability, and Liability, in THE ETHICS 
OF SELF-DEFENSE 110 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016) (endorsing a narrower 
version of fault forfeits first). 
31. This situation has been described as the “Provocateur Limitation.” Joshua D. 
Brooks, Deadly-Force Self-Defense and the Problem of the Silent, Subtle Provocateur, 24
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 540–44 (2015) (providing an example of when a victim 
is more culpable in an altercation).
 239
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certainly kill me.32  Her assault on me is unjustified and morally wrong 
but, given the circumstances, just barely morally wrong, and she is just 
barely culpable for launching it. In contrast, my despicable behavior toward
her is unexcused and extremely blameworthy.  I cannot duck or otherwise 
evade her approaching blow, but I can draw a weapon and kill her in an
instant, thereby preventing her blow from landing on me with lethal result.
However, because she is hardly culpable at all for her assault and I am
very culpable with respect to this situation, fault forfeits first singles me 
out as the person who ought to die in this situation if anyone does.  I would
be morally permitted to evade or duck the blow that threatens me if that
were possible, but being a culpable victim, I lack a self-defense right to 
save my life by killing the person whose assault threatens to kill me, even 
though defending myself by acting with lethal force against my attacker 
is the only way that I could survive.33  My significant culpability with respect
to this situation brings it about that, to this degree, I have forfeited my
moral right to self-defense.
III. CRITICISM OF THE ACCOUNT WITH RESPONSES
(A) Judith Thomson resists the idea that we should draw the line of moral 
permissibility between Villainous Aggressor and Innocent Aggressor, in 
which case one may kill to save one’s life—or the life of a threatened 
victim—only if the person one kills is a wrongful Aggressor who is 
culpable for acting wrongly.34 Let us concede that the Villainous Aggressor 
deserves punishment for his aggression.  Thomson comments, “But who 
are you, private person that you are, to be dishing out punishment to the 
villainous for the things that they do?”35 
In response: It is false that one who accepts fault forfeits first must
suppose private persons are morally entitled to inflict punishment in the 
self-defense scenarios depicted. Punishment is the deliberate imposition 
of suffering on an offender for his offense and is appropriate only when
the punishing agent has authority to impose such suffering and only when 
the person who is punished has been found guilty of an offense that merits 
punishment by means of a fair procedure for determining the accused’s
guilt or innocence. We may safely suppose these conditions on justified
punishment are not met when a person who is at risk of being a victim of
 32. See Steve P. Calanrillo & Dustin E. Buehler, Eggshell Economics: A Revolutionary 
Approach to the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 375, 377 (2013) (discussing
liability for defendants who harm victims with unknown conditions or unusual responses). 
33. See Brooks, supra note 31, at 544–46. 
34. Thomson, supra note 1, at 284–85. 
35. Id. at 285. 
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culpable aggression must decide what to do.36  Let it be granted that when 
a reasonably just government has been established, private persons standardly 
lack the authority to carry out punishment for aggressive violence—or at
the least, they lack authority to impose severe sanctions including imprisonment
and death.37  However, in the situations governed by fault forfeits first,
someone must die, and the question is, who is the most morally appropriate 
person to be singled out for death?  Whether one is entitled to punish is 
irrelevant to settling the issue. 
Further response: It is anyway conceivably morally appropriate for 
private persons living under a government to act in a punishing capacity.38 
Sometimes the government lacks capacity for enforcement.39  For example,
a seriously culpable wrongdoer is making his escape and afterward will 
never be within reach of the law.  Suppose you know all this, and in
particular are in an excellent epistemic position to know for sure that the 
offender is guilty and deserving of at least some quantum of punishment.
Here your epistemic command substitutes for carrying out a fair procedure 
to establish guilt or innocence; in this temporary state of nature situation 
the government’s unique entitlement to punish arguably lapses, and we 
can suppose your infliction of punishment on the wrongdoer will do some 
good by incapacitation or deterrence.  If your carrying out punishment 
would not create a scandal and erode respect for the law, punishing the 
offender might be acceptable in some circumstances. But to reiterate, the 
claim that one is bound to select a culpable offender for harm if it is the
only way to prevent harm to others in a situation does not rely on any
claimed authority to inflict punishment on the offender. 
(B) Recent philosophical discussions of culpability usually treat it differently 
from what this essay proposes.  The extant accounts regard it as an extra 
constraint on justified infliction of self-defensive harm.40  Roughly, the
 36. See Thomson, supra note 1, at 286. 
37. See R.A. Duff, Political Retributivism and Legal Moralism, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 179,
182 (2012). 
38. See id. at 181. 
39. See id. at 180. 
40. Jeff McMahan considers—without accepting—culpability in this way. JEFF
MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 403 (2002)
[hereinafter ETHICS OF KILLING]; Basis of Moral Liability, supra note 11, at 389–405; see 
also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, 24 L.&PHIL.711,734(2005) (accepting 
culpability as a necessary condition for becoming liable to a defensive harm).  But see Jeff 
McMahan, Self-Defense and Culpability, 24 L. & PHIL. 751, 763–764 (2005) [hereinafter 
Self-Defense and Culpability] (discussing culpability not associated with moral responsibility
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idea is that to be morally permitted to kill another to save oneself from 
death or grievous harm, it must be the case that one has a right not to be
subject to the threat of harm one faces.  The person one would kill to save 
oneself from this harm is morally responsible for imposing this risk of 
harm, and, in addition, this person is culpable for imposing this risk.  Against 
such an account, the objection is that culpability is not a necessary condition 
for justified infliction of self-defensive harm.41  Either the first two conditions
just listed suffice for a justification or some other substitute set of conditions
not including a culpability requirement suffices.
To introduce a complex type of case, suppose an unjust war of aggression 
is in progress and being resisted by warriors with a just cause.42  The
soldiers fighting on the unjust side of the conflict are misinformed about 
the relevant facts and believe they are waging a just war. Furthermore,
they are in no way culpable for being misinformed in this way. When
these morally innocent soldiers attack people—who in fact have a right to 
not be harmed—it is, to put it mildly, highly implausible to hold that the 
soldiers’ complete lack of culpability renders them morally ineligible targets 
of violence necessary to thwart their, in fact, unjust actions.43 
As stated, fault forfeits first does not insist moral culpability is a necessary 
condition for justified infliction of self-defensive harm, so the objection 
to the deployment of a culpability condition described above does not 
pose any objection to this norm.44  But this may seem to be a case where
the theorist is out of the frying pan and into the fire.  Fault forfeits first allows 
that when somebody is considering a violent act against another to save 
his own life, the culpability of the other, if sufficiently great, and sufficiently
greater than that of others who are involved in the situation and might 
instead be subjected to attack—may by itself suffice to justify the exercise
of lethal force.45  This means that when caught up in a situation in which
someone’s behavior or bodily movement is threatening to cause harm to
others, a person may be legitimately liable to being attacked even though 
she is neither doing anything nor behaving in such a way—nor is her body 
for imposing or causing an unjustified harm or threat of harm and holding that moral responsibility, 
absent culpability for a sufficiently serious wrongful harm, can suffice for liability to defensive
violence).
41. Richard Arneson, Resolving the Responsibility of Dilemma, in THE ETHICS OF 
WAR 67, 81 (Saba Bazargan-Forward & Samuel C. Rickless eds., 2017) [hereinafter Resolving 
the Responsibility].
42. See id. at 73. 
43. Seth Lazar presses this issue to argue for weaknesses in Jeff McMahan’s revisionary 
just war doctrine. See Seth Lazar, The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A
Review Essay, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 180, 181 (2010); see also Resolving the Responsibility, 
supra note 41 (stressing culpability in contrast to McMahan’s position). 
44. See supra pp. 232–235. 
45. See Resolving the Responsibility, supra note 41, at 81–82. 
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moving in such a way—that poses any threat of harm to any other person.46 
This feature of fault forfeits first may strike some as obviously morally
outrageous.
In response: We should not be stampeded by this concern into abandoning
fault forfeits first.  We should simply recall the examples already considered, 
especially Accommodation and Guilty Bystander, and consider whether
the judgments proposed for these situations are acceptable after reflective 
scrutiny.47  The underlying idea behind these judgments is that the moral 
shield that insulates a person from being the permissible target of a harmful
attack can be forfeited in whole or in part.  What triggers forfeiture of moral 
immunity from being subject to attack is egregious failure to show due 
consideration for others’ legitimate moral rights and interests.48  Failure
to have and show such concern tends to threaten others with receipt of 
wrongful harm in many situations, but the failure has moral significance 
in and of itself.  When an individual fails to show due concern for others, 
the reciprocal character of the obligation of constraints dictates that certain
behaviors toward that individual that would otherwise be required by the 
due concern requirement are, to some degree, lifted or suspended.49 
Of course, in many settings, sheer ill will toward others does not trigger
a right for them to impose otherwise unacceptable harm on the person 
manifesting this ill will.50  If I stick pins in a voodoo doll made to resemble
my neighbor, thereby intending to inflict bodily harm on him by voodoo 
magic, there is actually no risk of harm generated for anyone; therefore, 
my neighbor is not warranted to exercise force imposing harm on me. 
However, in unusual circumstances, where somebody’s behavior or bodily
movement does impose risk of harm on a person who has not forfeited
any of her rights not to be harmed, and where one may save the victim from 
harm by violent act, then fault forfeits first becomes applicable.  In these
circumstances, naked culpability not associated with any act that wrongfully
threatens harm to others—and unassociated with any causal involvement
in the harm that defensive violence aims to avert—can justify imposition 
46. Id.
 47. See supra pp. 237, 238–39. 
48. See Just War Theory, supra note 9, at 21. 
49. See David Rodin, The Problem with Prevention, in PREEMPTION: MILITARY ACTION
AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION 143, 164 (Henry Shue & David Rodin eds., 2007) (“[M]any
rights are implicitly reciprocal [and] on a plausible understanding of rights, one only has 
the right to life so long as one respects the right to life of others.”).
50. See NOMY ARPALY, UNPRINCIPLED VIRTUE: AN INQUIRY INTO MORAL AGENCY
172–73 (2003). 
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of harm against the culpable when necessary to protect innocent victims 
from harm.
Fault forfeits first claims neither that culpability is necessary nor sufficient 
for justified self-defensive killing.  The claim is rather that culpability is
a significant factor in determining whom, if anyone, it is acceptable to kill
in these scenarios, and in particular that culpability under certain conditions
establishes an ordering of morally preferred candidates for being the targets 
of violence when violence is necessary to save an innocent person’s life. 
(C) In law, and perhaps in morality, culpability in the air, unconnected 
to wrongful action, does not suffice for forfeiture of the culpable person’s 
rights, including rights against being attacked.51  Jonathan Quong writes, 
“Individuals can be blameworthy for acting on bad motives, but so long
as they do not violate anyone’s rights, their moral rights are unaffected.”52 
In a similar spirit, Seth Lazar writes, 
Suppose that you can save a saint from a threat only by killing a thief; the thief
had nothing to do with the threat at all, but he has stolen in the past.  The thief’s
bad character and past crimes are irrelevant to whether he is liable to be killed.
He is not connected to this threat, so he cannot be liable to be killed to avert it.53 
In response: The law does not and should not perfectly mirror the content 
of fundamental moral principles.54  The law, with its associated social norms, 
should be designed to function as an effective and fair means to promote 
conformity of people’s behavior to what fundamental morality dictates 
given the empirical conditions we all face, including epistemic and motivational 
gaps and deficits. In most actual self-defense scenarios, agents will have
no way of calculating who is most culpable in the situation and will be 
tempted to twist their spontaneous assessments to suit their interests.  So 
the law might rightly downplay the importance of culpability for liability
to defensive harm in familiar ways whereas fundamental moral principles 
do not.55 
However, at the level of fundamental moral principle, we can agree that 
bad character irrelevant to the situation at hand does not render one liable 
to permissible violence aimed at correcting or averting unjust wrongs.  But 
being blameworthy with respect to the situation at hand is a different
matter and, I submit, can trigger liability, even without any exercise of 
agency that is causally connected to wrongful harm or threat of such harm. 
51. See Jonathan Quong, Liability to Defensive Harm, 40 PHIL.&PUB.AFF 45, 54 (2012).
52. Id. 
53. SETH LAZAR, SPARING CIVILIANS 131 (2015). 
54. Richard Arneson, Discrimination, Disparate Impact, and Theories of Justice, 
in  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 87, 95 (Deborah Hellman & 
Sophia Moreau eds., 2013). 
55. See Quong, supra note 51, at 45, 47. 
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Suppose my thieving tendencies express themselves in the situation in
which the saint is in peril, but not in a way that causally produces injustice 
or threat of injustice.  Or suppose the most culpable agents in a war situation 
are the soldiers fighting for the just cause.56  They are acting from sheer 
race hatred; the fact that their acts are not violations of any moral rules is
an accidental fluke.  If one can advance the just war cause equally well by
killing some enemy soldiers—who are completely blameless for fighting 
for a bad cause—or one’s culpable comrades, fault forfeits first says one 
should shoot the culpable fellow soldiers rather than the blameless enemy.
IV. THE CLAIMED IRRELEVANCE OF WHAT WE CANNOT KNOW
Someone concerned with formulating moral rules that provide good
practical guidance to agents who are wondering if it is acceptable to attack
others to save one’s life and legal rules that facilitate the criminal justice 
system’s functioning to enforce these practical moral rules will balk at this 
Article’s reliance on improbable thought experiments.  We are seeking
guidance for agents in situations they will likely face, not solutions to
hypothetical puzzles lacking any relevance to real-world decision problems. 
Hence, one might object that in canonical self-defense scenarios agents 
will never be in a good or even a passable epistemic position to make the 
assessments of moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness required to
determine what fault forfeits first implies regarding what is permissible 
conduct in their actual decision problem.  The discussions in this Article 
simply distract us from the task of formulating moral rules for guidance. 
In response, we make moral judgments for evaluative purposes as well
as for practical guidance.  Studying the behavior of some distant historical 
figures, we might—from intellectual and moral curiosity—wish to determine
whether what they did was morally acceptable.  Someone killed another
to save her own life—was this morally permissible?  We might have a 
moral and intellectual interest in answering similar questions regarding current 
proposed actions—even if no issue of practical guidance accompanies the 
determination.  If Smith is going to employ violence to save himself from 
injury even if morally impermissible, the question remains, is Smith’s 
plan morally permissible?  Even if we can never see the inner workings 
of someone’s soul, Smith’s behavior may provide us valuable evidence 
regarding his moral blameworthiness or praiseworthiness.
 56. See supra p. 242. 
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In some cases, a person wondering whether attacking another is permissible
might be in a prime epistemic position to judge the culpability of those 
involved in the situation.  Whether these cases are rare or frequent is irrelevant. 
We can imagine an Innocent Aggressor scenario in which the person who 
becomes the threatened victim of the aggression has been deliberating for 
days with his back-fence neighbor, who is troubled about what to do in a 
situation he fears he might face.  His conscientious efforts to determine
what is right and his serious resolve to do what he thinks is right strikes the 
interlocutor as exemplary. To his surprise, the interlocutor finds himself a
victim of aggression and sees the aggressor is his back-fence neighbor,
surely an innocent, fully nonculpable aggressor.  By some similar coincidence,
the Innocent Aggressor’s threatened victim might also have good evidence
concerning the serious culpability of the nearby bystanders—whom he could 
kill to save his life. 
We should distinguish (1) what should be the laws governing permissible
uses of violence in self-defense or defense of others along with the social
norms and publicly proclaimed morality governing these matters from (2) 
what are the fundamental moral principles that hold universally and
timelessly and determine what in any situation ought to be done.57  Laws,
social norms, and public morality should be selected with the aim of promoting
adherence by people to fundamental moral norms.  Some factors that bear
on the issue of what morality permits, requires, and forbids at the fundamental
level, should perhaps disappear or appear only in simplified form at the secondary
and tertiary levels, because their retention would be counterproductive in
terms of encouraging people to adhere as closely as possible to the pattern
of conduct that fundamental principles enjoin.
V. CULPABILITY, WHAT? 
What is culpability?  To some extent I hope my defense of fault forfeits 
first stands independently of the question, what conception of culpability
or moral blameworthiness is best?  Readers might agree with my claims
about fault forfeits first but disagree with my understanding of culpability,
or readers may agree with me on culpability but not on fault forfeits first.
However, whether fault forfeits first is plausible will depend on how
culpability is understood.
Consider some sample views:
 57. See generally Just War Theory, supra note 9.
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Nomy Arpaly holds that a person’s moral worth can be positive or
negative.58 Negative moral worth is moral blameworthiness.59  Having 
moral worth, or lacking it, depends on one’s good or ill will.60  Arpaly writes,
If good will—the motive(s) from which praiseworthy actions stem—is responsiveness 
to moral reasons, deficiency in good will is insufficient responsiveness to moral 
reasons, obliviousness or indifference to morally relevant factors, and ill will is 
responsiveness to sinister reasons—reasons for which it is never moral to act, 
reasons that, in their essence, conflict with morality.61 
Also, a person can be more or less indifferent to moral reasons and more
or less powerfully motivated by the desire to act on sinister reasons.62 
According to Arpaly, whether one desires to act on sinister reasons
depends on whether the reasons really are sinister—not on whether one 
believes them to be sinister.63  The same holds for one’s obliviousness or
indifference to moral reasons.64 
Writing specifically about the morality of self-defense, Larry Alexander 
defines a “culpable aggressor” as one who meets two conditions.  First, 
the person “intends to commit an act in the future that he believes imposes 
risks of various magnitudes of harm on various types of [victims].”65 
Second, the person “believes that that the circumstances that will probably 
exist at the time he acts, discounted by his estimates of the probabilities 
of their existence,” will be thus and so, and their being thus and so in fact
renders the act he intends to commit unjustifiable—whether or not he believes
his act, as it will occur in the circumstances as he supposes them to be, 
will be unjustifiable.66 
A generic conception of what it means for an agent to be fully culpable 
for a wrong act is that the agent was responsible for doing that act and
lacked an excuse of false belief or duress.  According to both Arpaly and 
Alexander, falsely believing that one’s act is justified by a certain moral
principle does not qualify as a good excuse if the postulated moral principle
 58. ARPALY, supra note 50, at 69. 
59. Id.
 60. Id. at 79. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. at 101. 
63. See id. at 80. 
64. Id. at 79. 
65. Larry Alexander, Recipe for a Theory of Self-Defense, in THE ETHICS OF SELF­
DEFENSE 20, 21–22 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016). 
66. Id.
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is false.67  In this sense false moral beliefs do not remove or diminish
culpability.
These views, along with other common views of culpability, share the 
feature that one can be culpable for doing something wrong even if one lacked
a fair opportunity to have done the right thing instead.  For example, I 
might kill Sam under circumstances that render the act morally wrong,
but—through no fault of my own—I did not realize the act was morally 
wrong because—through no fault of my own—I have come to embrace 
false moral principles.  I might be motivated by sinister reasons, reasons
from which it is never moral to act, reasons that in their essence conflict 
with morality.68  For example, suppose utilitarianism is wrong and some 
opposed doctrine of moral rights is correct.  Doing what maximizes utility
is then never an adequate ground for action because any utility-maximizing 
act might also conflict with some person’s moral right, which ought to be 
honored.  In the example, assume killing Sam violates his moral right and 
is morally impermissible on that basis.  If the empirical facts are as I
suppose them to be, my act of killing Sam is unjustifiable, so my act is
culpable according to Alexander’s account as well.69 
“Through no fault of my own” needs to be parsed.  Suppose I worked 
hard to figure out the correct moral principles—seeking advice, deliberating 
hard, discerning what others who might serve as authority figures or 
helpful interlocutors believe, checking out their credentials and the quality
of their arguments, deliberating further, and so on.  However, I am inept 
at moral deliberation and I go badly astray.  Of course, it is my fault that 
my conscience is now wrongly calibrated. My practical reasoning is defective.
This is a fault in me.  However, this may be due to factors entirely beyond 
my power to control—bad early socialization, poor genetic endowment, 
and so on—so in another sense, my errors are not really my fault. 
Arpaly’s view captures an important ideal of moral praiseworthiness.70 
Someone whose actions are responsive to correct moral reasons and who 
is strongly motivated to bring it about that his acts are responsive to what 
are in fact correct moral reasons is surely morally praiseworthy.71  But the
antonym of being morally praiseworthy in this sense is not being morally 
blameworthy but rather something like being worthy of moral dispraise. 
Whether our choices and actions lie within our power to control is of
course a profoundly contested issue.  In this Article I pursue some implications
of supposing that the necessary conditions for being morally praiseworthy 
67. See ARPALY, supra note 50, at 104; Alexander, supra note 65, at 22. 
68. See ARPALY, supra note 50, at 109–10. 
69. See Alexander, supra note 65, at 22. 
70. See generally ARPALY, supra note 50. 
71. Id.
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or blameworthy—deserving or undeserving—set forth in the control 
principle are sometimes satisfied.  I do not argue this supposition is true. 
I further believe if we reject hard determinism and accept a view that 
leaves room for individual responsibility, we should still accept it would 
be unfair to hold individuals responsible for what lies entirely beyond
their power to control.  As noted above, arriving at correct beliefs about
what morality requires may be beyond one’s power to control. 
A conception that may perhaps meet the stated constraint will have to
be subjective.  Whether one is morally praiseworthy—in the morally 
blameworthy sense—depends not on whether one acts correctly for the 
right reasons but on whether one makes a conscientious, good faith effort 
to do so.  This will include making a conscientious, good faith effort to 
recognize correct principles that determine what is morally right.
The rough idea here is that—in some form or another—the question, 
what do we owe to one another or how should we treat others—including
other sentient creatures—is bound to occur to us.  One becomes morally
blameworthy by failing to make conscientious efforts to learn the answer
or for failing to make conscientious efforts to conform one’s conduct to
the requirements of morality as one perceives them.  One becomes morally
blameworthy by failing to make conscientious efforts to do the right thing. 
There are degrees of blameworthiness. 
This account cannot be right as it stands.  In some situations, making a 
conscientious effort to do what is right may seem inappropriate.  For example,
if one knows he will fail to do the right thing no matter how prodigious his
conscientious effort is, then expending the effort is just wasteful.  So, one
becomes morally blameworthy by failing to make conscientious efforts to
conduct oneself as morality dictates insofar as one deems such effort to 
be appropriate in the circumstances—with a further proviso that one must
make conscientious efforts to see to it that one’s appropriateness judgments
are correct. There is a regress here I suppose to be harmless.
This account still cannot be right as it stands.  My aim is to describe
a conception of culpability such that it will not be a matter of sheer luck 
beyond your power to control whether you become culpable or not.  But 
pursuing this aim may be a futile task, like a dog chasing its tail.  For one 
thing, it will be a matter of luck whether you encounter choice situations 
in your life that elicit a response from you that renders you culpable.  One 
person faces the stresses and temptations of a corrupt and charming boss, 
another does not.  For another thing, it is a matter of luck beyond your power 
to control whether you happen to have the desire to put forth a conscientious
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effort to show due consideration for others.  Some will have the desire and
some will not.  Among those who do, the desire will be a powerful motivation 
for some but not others. 
A response to the latter worry is that we must adjust a person’s raw 
deservingness score that registers the degree to which she puts forth
conscientious effort as appropriate by allowing for the fact that the ensemble
of circumstances people face, including their given pro-moral desires,
render it harder for some and easier for others to put forth conscientious
effort. However, any being with rational agency capacities that meet the
threshold level of personhood will have some curiosity about what one owes
to others and some concern to give what one owes. 
A response to the former worry is that it can indeed be a matter of sheer 
luck that one person’s good or evil dispositions face situations in which
they manifest in choice and action while another person’s do not.  Whether 
one is culpable with respect to a particular situation is thus partly beyond
one’s control, insofar as it is beyond one’s power to control what decision
problems one faces and what situations one confronts.  Of course, what
decision problems one faces may lie within one’s power to control to a 
degree. One should avoid the near occasions of sin. But this should is pro
tanto; one’s conscientious judgment might be that morality requires one to
enter the lions’ den even if this means he will then face a severe temptation 
to be wrongfully mean toward the lions. 
Suppose two persons dispose themselves to do evil and are strictly culpable
for doing so.  If the two persons are equally firmly disposed to do evil
and—by sheer luck—one faces a situation that triggers the disposition and 
the other does not, they are equally morally culpable.  Sheer luck beyond 
their power to control cannot render one more culpable than the other.  But 
then we must recognize that people’s culpability may not be fully comparable.  
Suppose three persons are equally culpable and equally, but not fully, disposed 
to do evil. Two of the persons face a temptation and one does not, and of 
the two tempted persons, one by dint of hard effort resists the temptation 
and the other, who could have done exactly the same, does not, and does evil. 
There may be no determinate fact of the matter as to whether the person
who by luck evaded the temptation would have succumbed if the person
had not evaded it, and so no determinate fact of the matter as to whether 
the one who escaped temptation is more or less morally deserving than 
the one who faced it and succumbed.  But the no-moral-luck constraint
does not govern any and all moral judgments we might make, just those 
concerning a person’s moral worth, moral praiseworthiness, blameworthiness,
or basic deservingness score. 
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VI. CULPABILITY WITH RESPECT TO A SITUATION
The idea of culpability that figures in this Article is being culpable with 
respect to a situation.  The italicized phrase is crucial, though vague.  As
Seth Lazar notes, merely being a generally bad person or having bad moral
character would not suffice to render one liable to self-defensive harm.72 
If you are under threat from an approaching freight train and could save 
your life only by killing a bystander, the fact that the bystander is a bank robber
or cheats outrageously in high stakes card games, does not render the bystander 
a legitimate target of attack.73  For that, the bystander’s culpability must
be relevant to the situation at hand.74  The bystander must be involved in
the situation in some seriously blameworthy way, or else her culpability
does not trigger any forfeiture of her moral immunity from being attacked. 
Noticing culpability in the air—entirely unrelated to the threat the
mitigation of which justifies violence—is irrelevant to liability to self-
defensive harm, does nothing to rule out culpability unconnected to causation 
of wrongful threat as a determiner of who may be attacked.75  For example, a
grievously wrongful intention or disposition of will can do the job. In the 
freight train example, suppose the bystander is here and now firmly disposed
to inflict wrongful harm on the person threatened by the train if he could
do so. He is not acting on the disposition because he sees no way to attack
the threatened person, so he is not posing any wrongful threat.  I submit 
that the bystander who is culpable in this way has rendered himself a 
permissible target of violence if that will mitigate the threat to the innocent
person. 
Jeff McMahan describes an example in which you are under lethal
threat from two culpable assailants acting entirely independently.76  It is a
matter of coincidence that they and you are all in a dark alley at the same 
time, which turns out to be a good venue for assault.  Your body is exposed 
to one attacker and his shots will soon kill you, but you have no effective 
means of defense.77  However, you can shoot the other attacker, from whose
attack you are shielded, and you see that if you do, his falling body will
 72. See LAZAR, supra note 53, at 131. 
73. See id.
 74. See id. at 131–32. 
75.  See id. at 127–28, 132. 
76.  Self-Defense and Culpability, supra note 40, at 757 (describing what McMahan calls 
the “Basement Window” case). 
77. Id.
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obstruct the genuinely threatening attack being launched by the other.78 
McMahan acknowledges he is inclined to judge that you would be justified
by attacking the nonthreatening culpable attacker to save yourself from 
harm.79  But, he worries there is no principled way to distinguish this case 
from others in which a wrongful threat could be averted by attacking a
culpable individual or one of bad moral character where the culpability
intuitively has nothing at all to do with the threat being averted, but where 
by some coincidence killing the culpable would bring about reduction or
elimination of this threat.80 
McMahan is right to worry.  It is desirable to have a principled norm to
guide intuitive judgment.  This we lack. But it would be a mistake to be
inhibited on this basis from recognizing that where, as here, the agent’s 
serious culpability arises from some feature of his agency that involves
morally inappropriate attitudes toward the threat that the threatened person 
faces, he may become a permissible target of attack.  In McMahan’s example, 
we suppose the ineffective attacker is disposed to welcome the attack by
the other and to assist that attack if he could.  We need to add that we must
also suppose the disposition does not simply afflict the agent in ways beyond
his power to control, but arises in him and is sustained by processes for 
which he should be deemed accountable.  To the degree this is only partially 
so, his culpability diminishes; if it is not so at all, culpability vanishes.81 
In another example, we might imagine an onlooker who celebrates the 
impending harm about to fall on the innocent person and is made gleeful
by the prospect of grievous harm to this innocent.  Here too there are seriously 
morally wrong attitudes directed at what is happening to the threatened 
person in this situation. 
VII. NECESSITY
Consider the moral requirement that self-defense, to be justified, must
be necessary to avert or mitigate the harms that would result from the 
wrongful attack that is claimed to be the legitimate object of self-defense. 
As Seth Lazar and others have noticed, the necessity idea invoked here is 
not transparent.82  Suppose that a threatened victim could choose any of a 
78. Id.
 79. Id. at 758–59. 
80. Id. at 764–65; Basis of Moral Liability, supra note 11, at 386, 393. 
81. For a clear statement of the position that the control principle is never satisfied,
so the conditions for holding agents to be morally culpable or praiseworthy are never
obtained, see 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS 264–66, 268 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 2011). 
82. See FROWE, supra note 24, at 88–119; Joanna Mary Firth & Jonathan Quong, 
Necessity, Liability, and Defensive Harm, 31 L. & PHIL. 673, 674–75 (2012); Seth Lazar,
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range of defensive actions against an aggressor, the actions differing in 
their associated probabilities of lessening to varying degrees the threatened 
harm to the victim and in their associated probabilities of causing harm of 
varying magnitudes to the aggressor. 83  Where along these scales does a 
proposed self-defense fail to satisfy the necessity condition?  This Article 
sets this important issue to the side. 
Here I make the vague suggestion that the victim ought to shoulder some
costs rather than impose harm as great as death on an attacker.  If the threatened 
victim can with certainty escape a wrongful attack by parachuting to 
safety, at a cost of a sprained ankle, or could alternatively save herself from 
harm by shooting her attacker dead, she must parachute.  Also, the victim
must accept some risk of grievous harm to herself rather than shoot to kill 
or the equivalent.  If parachuting to safety would give her a .999 chance 
of saving herself and a .001 chance of death, she must take the escape 
option. The intuitive idea is that an attacker’s well-being interests are
discounted morally, but not discounted to zero, by virtue of his wrongful 
action.84 
Also, I suggest culpability, if any, on the part of the attacker lessens the
weight of his welfare interests in the necessity calculation and for that 
matter the victim’s culpability, if any, triggers a similar discounting of her 
welfare interests.  A culpable victim must shoulder greater costs and greater
risk of harm rather than shift all risk and costs to attacker if she can and
the greater the culpability of the attacker, the less solicitude for his well­
being is morally dictated.  In this determination, a comparative weighing 
of the victim and attacker’s culpability is called for. 
There is a limit to this discounting.  If the victim has an available course
of action that eliminates all risk that she will suffer serious harm from the 
wrongful attack that is in the offing, the victim is morally required to take 
that option rather than impose unnecessary harm on her attacker.85  If this 
issue is correctly framed in terms of forfeiture of rights, the point is that
no matter how culpable the attacker would be, the attacker does not forfeit
the right to minimal consideration of the sort that is in play when one refrains
from imposing death or grievous injury on a person when there is no
Necessity in Self-Defense and War, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (2012) [hereinafter Necessity
in Self-Defense].
83. For a discussion of this issue, see Necessity in Self-Defense, supra note 82, at 
9–21. 
84. See id. at 21–23. 
85. Id. at 15. 
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significant cost to oneself attached to the refraining.  Hitler merits minimal
consideration. Every person does.
We should note a further issue, a loose end left dangling.  What benefits, 
in terms of wrongful harm diminution or mitigation, can count in the
determination of whether proposed self-defense is necessary?  Suppose 
one can save oneself from aggressive attack by parachuting to safety, but 
one has available an alternative action that will kill his aggressor and thereby 
(a) save oneself from harm and also (b) prevent him from certainly—or 
with high probability—aggressing against others in the near future.  Is 
attacking the aggressor in this situation to secure the extra harm avoidance 
in (b) an act that satisfies the necessity condition?  We could also imagine 
a variant case in which, by counter-attack, the victim could secure (b) but
not (a). 
Whether or not one believes the counter-measures to wrongful attack 
described above to be self-defense, one should allow that if one is permitted 
to kill an aggressor in given circumstances when necessary to save one’s
own life, one should also be permitted to kill an aggressor if necessary to
prevent that person from wrongfully killing another. Moreover, if attacking 
an attacker to save another is permissible, it is surely permissible if—along 
with saving another one also saves oneself—one gets (a) and (b) gains together. 
Culpability also plays a role in untangling rights and wrongs, and 
permissible and impermissible action, in cases in which the necessity
condition for justified self-defense is breached and a victim of threatened 
attack wrongly counter-attacks when she could certainly escape all harm
by availing herself of an escape route.  Culpability here figures in the 
determination of what should be done via fault forfeits first.  Consider a 
variant of an example introduced by Helen Frowe86 for another purpose: 
A. Unnecessary Self-Defense 
Culpable Aggressor is attacking the victim, who has the options of 
escaping the attack by leaping to safety or instead shooting Aggressor.87 
She commences shooting.  For anyone who adheres to a necessity condition 
for justified self-defense—as I believe we all should do—Frowe’s victim
is acting impermissibly.  In these circumstances she lacks a right to attack
her attacker.  Does that imply that the moral tables are now turned, and
Culpable Aggressor has a self-defense right to attack his intended victim?
This implication might seem dubious. 
First, let us suppose Culpable Aggressor is not a leopard who somehow 
changes his spots. Culpable Aggressor still has murderous designs on the 
86. FROWE, supra note 24, at 88 (detailing the “Lucky Escape” example).
87. See id.
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victim, even after the victim counter-attacks.  Here fault forfeits first yields
plausible verdicts. Suppose that the aggressor is just barely culpable for 
his aggression—perhaps his responsibility is diminished, though not 
extinguished, by innocent drug-taking, as would be the case if someone
surreptitiously poured a mild aggression potion in his coffee.  Suppose 
also that the victim’s culpability is great—perhaps the aggressor is of Asian 
origin and the victim hates Asians and has been waiting for a chance to 
get away with killing one. Her serious and much much greater blameworthiness 
makes her the person who should die if anyone must die in this scenario. 
If the culpability comparison instead issues in the verdict that the victim
is far less blameworthy than Culpable Aggressor, then all things considered
he and not she is the eligible target of violence.  If the fault forfeits first
test does not yield a clear verdict, then it is wrong for each to be attacking
the other and there is no morally preferred, much less required target of 
violence. 
A variant is worth mentioning.  Suppose just as the victim comes to the 
place where she must choose either to take the escape option or start shooting 
if she wants to live. Culpable Aggressor suddenly repents and either stops 
aggressing or becomes disposed to stop if he could—perhaps he has
unleashed a robot attacker and he cannot now control it, though shooting 
him would somehow cause the robot to malfunction. So, one might say a 
new situation has emerged, in which the victim is now attacking either
a former or unwilling aggressor.  One might argue that according to fault 
forfeits first in the new situation, the victim is seriously culpable and the 
more seriously culpable member of the group of two of which one must die.
Once again, the example raises the question of how to individuate situations
for the purpose of deciding who is culpable and to what degree with respect 
to this situation.  I think being responsible by way of past culpable aggression 
for the victim’s present plight still renders one seriously culpable with respect 
to the current situation.  So, it is not obvious that Culpable Aggressor may
permissibly shoot at the victim in self-defense, even though it is taken for 
granted that the victim, in attacking, is acting impermissibly.  But, the 
example reminds us that we need more of an account of being culpable
with regard to the situation at hand than I am providing.
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Finally, consider the related issue posed by stand-your-ground scenarios.88 
A Culpable Aggressor takes something by force that rightfully belongs to
a the victim, or threatens to harm the victim unless the victim relinquishes 
some right.  The victim could safely retreat, and no vital interest of his would 
then be at stake.  Some hold it is morally permissible to respond with
defensive violence, even lethal violence if need be, rather than yield—for 
the present—some small right to the Culpable Aggressor.89  Such violence 
is not necessary to defend any vital interest or large right of the victim and
seems disproportionate if executed as a means to protect the victim’s small 
right or nonvital interest.90 
Stand-your-ground scenarios differ in morally significant ways.  Here
is an argument that appears to vindicate the claim that it is morally acceptable 
to kill culpable aggressors to defend against small wrongful losses in one 
range of cases. Suppose A wrongfully harms B, perhaps taking what belongs
to B. The taking does not harm B to such an extent as to justify killing A 
in response and reclaiming what belongs to B by right.  But consider a
series of proportionate responses. B forcefully acts to reclaim her rightful 
property, imposing a no more than proportionate harm on A.  A responds 
with greater wrongful force.  In response to this further wrongful attack, B
escalates her defensive response, which is again no more than is proportionate
to the cumulative harm and threat of harm she has suffered.  A responds
again with escalated force, and the cycle continues until B responds with
lethal force.  At this point, we are supposing that B’s lethal defensive response 
is no more than proportionate to the cumulative wrongful harms and threats 
of harm delivered by A. 
Moreover, suppose that B correctly foresees this sequence will unfold
if she responds to the violation of her rights with a series of proportionate 
responses. Suppose she instead attacks A preemptively, reasoning that if
she engages in the step by step response, she will be undergoing some risk
that A, at any point, might jump the queue and impose lethal violence on
her. For her own safety, B attacks A with lethal force just after the initial
88. In stand-your-ground scenarios, a victim of a threat may use force, including possibly
lethal force, to stand her ground against an aggressor “even if the victim could avoid [doing 
so by] retreating.” No-Retreat Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
89. For example, Heidi Hurd stipulates that stand-your-ground lethal violence may
not be deployed in de minimis matters but allows that defending property or the right to
remain standing where one has a right to stand in the face of a culpable aggressor’s demand 
to retreat can pass the threshold of rights that may be defended with lethal violence if there 
is no other way to secure the right here and now. Heidi M. Hurd, Stand Your Ground, in
THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 254, 254–56 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016). 
90. See Seth Lazar, National Defence, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Political 
Aggression, in THE MORALITY OF DEFENSIVE WAR 22–32 (Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar eds., 
2004). 
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transgression by A.  If lethal violence by B against A is justified in the step 
by step escalation, is lethal violence by B against A not justified in the
version if the story in which she preempts the certain-to-occur sequence 
and responds with lethal violence against A at the first step? 
Despite the plausibility of the arguments just stated, we should find
them fallacious.  Explaining why this is so is a bit tricky.  Consider another 
case. A wrongfully insults B, for example, by asserting, “Your mother dresses 
you funny.” B foresees that if she responds, A will certainly respond with 
entirely unjustified lethal violence, and B will then have a right of self-
defense to kill A to save her life in the face of this wrongful attack.  In this 
situation, we should hold that B is morally bound to refrain from taking— 
what in other circumstances would be—a proportionate defensive response
to A’s wrongful insult.  She has a humanitarian duty toward A not to do what
she knows would stir A to wrongful action leading to his death. 
Morality can require forbearance, including forbearance in the face of 
violations of one’s moral rights. If A steals a few dollars from B, the innocent 
victim B is not permitted to kill A to reclaim her small bit of property.  I 
suggest an extension of this idea.  In this situation, B is not morally permitted 
to initiate steps that she knows will provoke disproportionate or flatly wrongful 
responses by A, leading to a situation in which B becomes liable to lethal
defensive violence.  This result would be reached by a consequentialist
calculation employing any sensible estimation of the values at stake. More
controversially, I submit that a sensible deontology, a morality of do’s and 
don’ts and of constraints and options, should reach a similar result in this 
sort of case.
There is a potential confounding factor here that I simply want to set 
aside despite its practical importance in likely scenarios. If A would respond 
with lethal force to a verbal counter-insult, he appears to be a loose cannon, 
likely to be dangerous in future interactions with whomever he encounters.
Harming him, and even provoking him to bring about a situation in which
he becomes liable to be killed, might be acceptable all things considered,
taking these risks of future harms he might well perpetrate into account.
Let us focus on the simpler case in which these complications are not present. 
To see the point at issue, it may help to focus on situations in which 
only slight harms are at stake.  Sometimes one’s associates and colleagues
and friends behave in ways that are wrongfully inconsiderate, but still, the 
morally required response is that one overlook the slight infraction and 
carry on in good spirits, for the sake of harmony.  A defensive response may
provoke unjustified counter response and a hostile sequence that should 
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be avoided. The issue here is not long-term deterrence and long-term 
maintenance of peace, but simply avoidance of short-term bads.  Part of 
one’s duty to be kind to interaction partners is a duty to assist them to
avoid harmful wrongdoing that will injure themselves and others.  One
may have this duty not only to people to whom one has special ties but
also to strangers and acquaintances.  Exactly the same is true when the 
stakes are raised and avoidance of lethal defense is in play. 
The judgment that it is wrong to kill even a very culpable aggressor
when doing so is not necessary to secure one’s own vital interests or
important rights, and would not bring about wider benefits, rests on a duty
of humanity each of us owes to any person in any decision problem: do
not seriously harm a person when nothing important is thereby gained.  In
making a moralized cost and benefit calculation that determines whether 
imposing harm on a person is justified, all things considered, the vital interests 
of the person one might harm count for a lot, even if those interests are 
somewhat discounted by the that person’s culpability.  “Somewhat discounted” 
indicates that being culpable never obliterates the moral value of bringing 
about gains or avoiding harms for the culpable.91  The same duty of care
and concern for everyone and anyone can rule out doing what one would
otherwise have a perfect right to do, except that one foresees that doing it 
would trigger wrongdoing by another that would make killing him a 
proportionate response.  Culpability has its limits. 
VIII. PROPORTIONALITY, FUTILE SELF-DEFENSE, AND CULPABILITY
Justified self-defense satisfies a proportionality condition.92  I have a right
of self-defense against someone who wrongfully verbally assaults me, 
perhaps.  I am licensed to defend myself by verbal retort and perhaps even
by a physical shove or push—think of cases in which I lack the mental
capacity for firing an effective verbal retort.  But, it is morally impermissible
for me to counterattack by launching serious physical blows or shooting
the person in the leg.  These acts would violate proportionality.  The good 
to be gained by self-defensive action must be proportionate to the harm 
that is threatened.93  A proportionate defensive harm is at least not greatly 
in excess of the harm that is averted.94 
Many commentators have noted that proportionality so understood includes 
a contestable “success condition.”95  In the evidential sense of justification,
 91. See Basis of Moral Liability, supra note 11, at 395. 
92. See Uniacke, supra note 16, at 269. 
93. Id.
 94. See Just War Theory, supra note 9, at 19. 
95. Id. at 75–76. 
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one’s self-defensive act, on the basis of the evidence available to the
agent, must reasonably be expected to do enough good, by reduction of 
the harm threatened by the attack, in comparison to the harm threatened
by the attack.  If not, proportionality is violated.  But, if the proposed self-
defensive act launched by or on behalf of the victim does nothing to stop
or mitigate the attack, this proportionality condition cannot be satisfied. 
This implication delivered by the many views of self-defense that accept
the proportionality condition has seemed, to some commentators, to be a 
devastating bullet for these doctrines to bite.96  Surely, they say, it is 
permissible for a rape victim to fight back against her attacker even if such 
attack will do no good whatsoever: will not reduce the harm she suffers 
and may aggravate it, will not deter the aggressor or other aggressors from 
inflicting wrongs on other potential victims, and will not bring about any 
other good either.97 
Appeal to the claims this Article defends—that culpability significantly 
affects the limits of permissible self-defense and also that fault forfeits 
first—do not resolve the puzzle here because proportionality is claimed to
be a necessary condition on morally permissible self-defense.  The intuitively 
plausible claim that entirely futile resistance to culpable aggression can 
be morally justified challenges proportionality as standardly understood.
As Uwe Steinhoff observed, postulating that the Culpable Aggressor forfeits
her right not to be harmed in some reciprocal way also fails to resolve the
puzzle because the fact that the Culpable Aggressor lacks a claim right not to
be harmed does not mean harming such an individual is morally justified.98 
In the face of the puzzle, some observers postulate some further good 
that seemingly futile self-defense might achieve, so proportionality is after 
all satisfiable in such cases.99 Along this line, Daniel Statman proposes 
that wrongful aggressors challenge our status as persons with dignity and 
96. Uwe Steinhoff is one of these commentators.  His solution is to deny that it is a
conceptual necessity that self-defense must aim to reduce the harm threatened by an unjust
attack. See Just War Theory, supra note 9, at 9. 
97. Steinhoff posits that (1) self-defense might aim at resisting attack without being 
accompanied by any aim of reducing its harm; (2) self-defense does not require a goal of 
success—one can strive to stay an aggressor’s knife hand while knowing this attempt at 
resistance will fail; and (3) there simply is a basic right of self-defense—understood as a right
of the victim and others to resist wrongful attack—that is not conditional on an expectation
of gain from the resistance—at least when the victim is facing a culpable aggressor. Id. at
20. 
98. Id. at 22. 
99. Id. at 19–20. 
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worth; violent counter-violence gains the counter-attacker honor in the 
face of this challenge.100  One wonders, however, why honor could not be
regained by a calm assertion, in thought or speech, that the aggressor is wrong 
and that one is a person with equal dignity and worth, and why reclaiming
honor in that way—if honor is ever at stake in such proceedings—is not 
the morally required stance. 
Taken strictly, this challenge to the proportionality condition on permissible 
self-defense is off the topic of this Article, which is concerned with delineating
the role of culpability in determining the boundaries of permissible and 
impermissible self-defense.  However, we should accept a framing of these 
issues that presupposes that proportionality as standardly understood is 
acceptable. The challenge of futile self-defense makes me see that a more 
accurate formulation of the underlying fault forfeits first thought than we 
have been considering so far is that if and only if someone must die when
unjust wrongs are being perpetrated, then provided that any choice to kill 
targets the same number of individuals, it is morally required that the 
seriously culpable with respect to this situation, if more culpable than others
whose deaths would serve the purpose, be chosen as the targets of violence.
The unjust harm reduction project must target the especially culpable 
independent of their causal role in bringing about the unjust harm.  This
formulation allows that if no especially culpable agents are available
whose deaths would serve this unjust harm reduction project, others may
perhaps be targeted for violence for the greater good.  The formulation 
leaves open what should be done when one can achieve a reduction of unjust
harm by attacking larger number of especially culpable agents rather than 
a smaller number of individuals who might be deemed eligible on other 
grounds, but I have added that the greater the culpability of the especially
culpable, the greater the case for killing them, rather than smaller numbers 
of others, to achieve the same good end.  But, the “if and only if” phrasing
rules out futile self-defense as morally impermissible.
The justification I offer appeals to the simple idea that every single person’s 
life is valuable, sacred if you will, regardless of the uses one makes of the
rational agency capacities that confer personhood status.  Whatever one 
has done, however morally bad one’s character, it is morally better to keep 
one alive and give one the opportunity to live well in the future and perhaps
do good for others as well as oneself—at least when the opportunity provision 
is costless for others. If one can prevent injustice without harming even
Hitler, he is morally required to do so, unless refraining from harming Hitler 
somehow imposes costs on others that they are not morally required to bear.
 100. Daniel Statman, On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self-Defense, 118 ETHICS 
659, 668 (2008); see also FROWE, supra note 24, at 123–60 (endorsing Statman’s view of
this point). But see Just War Theory, supra note 9 (demurring). 
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In another terminology, rights forfeiture is always limited and conditional— 
never absolutely sweeping and across the board. 
To this I simply add that the supposition that harming the culpable
aggressor is completely futile is a strong assumption.  Usually imposing 
costs on an aggressor has at least some slight tendency to deter future similar 
acts by this aggressor or others.  Usually resistance to aggression has some
chance of reducing the harm of the attack, even if the overall expected benefit 
is small.
Also, I note that even if we were to accept a retributivist view of 
punishment, in some cases, what looks like futile resistance, serves the 
cause of retributive justice in a rough and ready way.  The victim may
foresee that there is some chance, perhaps even a certainty, that the culpable 
aggressor will not be apprehended and brought to a fair trial and punished— 
the infliction of the harm of punishment on the culpable offender being in
itself morally desirable according to retributivism.  Because she is arguably 
in a good epistemic position to know the aggressor menacing her is truly
culpable, she might justifiably engage in vigilante action that imposes on 
the culpable aggressor some of the punishment that is morally desirable 
for its own sake that he receive.101  In this way seemingly futile self-defense
when inspected more closely will be seen sometimes to do some good and 
to satisfy proportionality. 
This Article rests on a view of culpability that rules out retributivism as 
unjustified.  Punishing a person for culpable wrongdoing must have expected
positive value and expectably do some good for future potential crime 
victims, others, or the agent herself. The inherent value of each life
is nonforfeitable and so the life of the most culpable agent has moral value 
and should not be sacrificed unless the sacrifice does some good.  But, I 
do not claim to defend the rejection of retributivism presupposed in this
Article.  I simply note that according to this Article there are strict limits to
the efficacy of culpability in justifying counter-violence.  Hence, proposed
self-defense that is futile, and so really fails to satisfy proportionality,
is forbidden. But someone might accept some of the thinking about culpability
asserted in this Article while also defending a retributivist view of punishment, 
and for someone whose thinking runs along this line, the puzzle of the 
101. Judith Thomson explicitly rejects this vigilante punishment rationale for killing
a culpable aggressor to save one’s own life when it is threatened by his aggression.  See Thomson,
supra note 1, at 302. I suggest we should accept vigilantism at least in principle but
reject retributivism.
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seemingly moral acceptability of futile self-defense can in some cases be
eased.  What seems futile might not, under closer scrutiny, really look to be
so. 
IX. MORAL CULPABILITY AND MORAL PRAISEWORTHINESS
If culpability plays a significant role in determining who is an eligible 
target of violence when innocent persons are under threat, as argued here, 
one might wonder whether positive deservingness with respect to a situation 
can insulate one from such eligibility.  To explore this issue, consider a 
variant of an example introduced by Jeff McMahan to illustrate his proposal 
that someone might be liable to defensive violence via being morally
responsible for a threat even though one’s conduct is morally faultless.102 
He imagines a driver of a car, proceeding with due caution and having
kept the car in good order by due diligence, who through no fault of her
own “veer[s] out of control.”103 Driver’s car skids toward a pedestrian walking 
on the adjacent sidewalk.104 McMahan suggests the driver, being morally
responsible by initiating a reasonable but risky action, is liable to self-defensive 
violence if necessary to save the pedestrian’s life.105  I am myself skeptical 
of this position. But consider the following scenario: 
A. Hero 
An ambulance driver heroically volunteers to drive through a minefield 
to deliver desperately needed medicine to wounded individuals.  Returning 
through the same minefield, his ambulance skids out of control, despite
his faultless, careful driving, and the vehicle threatens to crash into a
pedestrian with lethal force. 
My intuition is that even if—big if—one should agree with McMahan 
that in his example the faultless driver exposes herself to self-defensive 
violence, one should still demur at this same judgment regarding Hero. This
suggests positive desert affects liability just as negative desert— 
blameworthiness.  One might suspect our intuition about the case is clouded 
by the surmise that its being known that heroes are liable to be killed in
such scenarios dampens the motivation of potential future heroes, with bad 
consequences.  We stipulate this in this example no such consequences are in
the offing.
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Consider another example—a variant on an Innocent Aggressor case:
B. Aggressive Heroine
An individual by dint if extraordinary virtuous attempts to discover the 
relevant facts of an ominous situation comes to have the false belief Smith
is a culpable aggressor whose seemingly innocent action of walking across a
park will trigger an attack that will kill many innocent people.  The
individual also believes that if she tries to stop Smith from unleashing this 
attack by running over him with her car, it is overwhelmingly likely Smith 
will kill her. Nonetheless she goes after him with her car.  Smith actually
is entirely innocent and is simply walking across a park, threatening 
no one.  He happens somehow to be apprised of the situation.  He can save 
his life only by shooting the heroic aggressor.
I submit that we ought to hold that Aggressive Heroine is insulated from 
liability to self-defensive violence in this situation by her great deservingness
in this situation. Even if—big if—we should hold that a threatened person
would be permitted to kill an innocent—but not especially positively 
deserving—aggressor if doing so was necessary to save his life from the
threat posed by the aggressor’s conduct, the judgment should shift as we vary
the example by cranking up the innocent aggressor’s positive deservingness. 
However, accepting that fault forfeits first has a companion principle in
praiseworthiness forfeits last does not require any commitment to symmetry.
Maybe culpability matters more, in rendering an individual a morally apt
target of self-defensive violence, than moral praiseworthiness matters in 
rendering an individual an inapt recipient of such violence. 
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